Chapter 1— Part III

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The dark side of government: Patronage

Patronage continues to be the bane of cost–effective and fair local and state government. Hiring on the basis of who you know rather than what you know has consistently led to wasteful, ineffective government employees. Bloated patronage armies continue to be one of the major reasons some state and local governments face a constant fiscal crisis.

Patronage is not limited to “non–professional” positions. By practicing “pin–stripe patronage,” political bosses have been able to steer excessively lucrative consulting contracts to favored law and accounting firms, suppliers, and consultants who contribute heavily come election time.

Fortunately, most government hiring in this country appears to be based on merit. But far too much patronage remains. Rather than rant and rave further about the dimensions of the problem, let’s give the last word to retired University of Pittsburgh public administration professor Christine Altenberger with the following article of hers from the November 1, 1990 issue of PA Times, published by the American Society for Public Administration. The article is reprinted with Ms. Altenberger’s permission.

 Is patronage an ethical “No–No?”  

Like other cities around the country, the City of Pittsburgh is in the process of drafting a Code of Ethics. It is fairly predictable that the debate over what, if anything, to say about patronage will be lively, and may generate more heat than light. It is a difficult area, but I hope that Code drafters will speak in a very restrictive way to patronage — for our purposes here, the awarding of public jobs to friends, relatives and political supporters. (I will beg the question of merit. Those practicing patronage almost always will assert the high qualifications of their appointees.)

What’s wrong with patronage? The U.S. Supreme Court pondered that question in 1976 (Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347). Here, in the time–honored fashion, after local elections, the Republican sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, and other Republicans were replaced by Democrats. In a close decision, the Court held the dismissals unconstitutional: “The cost of the practice of patronage is the restraint it places on the freedoms of belief and association. It breeds inefficiency, corruption and ineffective administration.” The majority felt that accountability could be achieved by limiting patronage to policy–making positions — not the case in Cook County. In a stirring dissent, Justice Powell countered by saying, “The history and long prevailing practice across the country support the view that patronage hiring practices make a sufficiently substantial contribution to the practical functioning of our democratic system to support their relatively modest intrusion on first amendment interests….” The majority was not convinced.

The Court, in 1980, expanded and strengthened its holding in Elrod, saying that the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label “policy–maker” or “confidential” fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for effective performance of the public office involved. (Branti v Finkel, 445 U.S. 507.) The Court, then, in these two cases … has placed significant restrictions on patronage practices. Nevertheless, there is still plenty of room for creative posturing and drafting of job descriptions.

But there is more to the ethical dimensions of patronage than has been addressed by the Court. There is more than questions of efficiency and good administration. There are larger issues and they have to do  with the whole image of government and its ability to command the respect and trust of the people. This point is well illustrated in an article in the New York Times, March 27, 1986, headline: “The Power of Patronage.”

Federal indictments, in addition to listing extortion and bribery counts, charged that a city official and a former official used their ability to place people in city jobs as a tool to turn a city agency into a money–making machine. These officials controlled the City Parking Violations Bureau from the outside, because they used the power of political patronage to put their associates into key jobs…. They turned the P.V.B. into their own private property, and it doesn’t belong to them.

The very essence of a free government must be grounded in the belief that public offices are public trusts, bestowed for the good of the country and not for the benefit of friends, relatives, and political supporters of those in public office. The intricate web that is forged by patronage in governments across the country, in School Districts, and in authorities and special districts, is not only unfair, not only leads to corruption and inefficiency — it tears at the whole fabric of government. Is it wide–spread? You bet, if my clipping file is any indication. Is it an ethical “no–no?” Absolutely.

But wait. Is the answer really so easy and absolute? Consider the following case:

You are a member of a city council. There are two vacancies in your police department, and the city proceeds to hire two new officers. Under civil service the positions are publicly advertised, there is a competitive examination, and the top three names are certified to council. Your son takes the test and achieves the top score. He is hired by a unanimous vote of council.

Should there be a rule prohibiting relatives of elected officials from competing for city jobs?
o  Yes        o  No

Should you have discouraged your son from applying for the police job in the first place?
o  Yes        o  No

Should you have voted on his appointment?
o  Yes        o  No

Interestingly, where this case has been “tossed out” for discussion with elected officials and others, there is strong disagreement, particularly with respect to the first two questions. A big concern is perception — how does this action look when it becomes public? How much should perception count in formulating a rule for the ethical code?

Since there is really not an easy answer to the patronage issue, is there help for those charged with pondering whether or not to restrict or prohibit its practice? Perhaps the best we can do is to keep before us a conceptual framework which provides the basis for evaluating every moral system. That framework has as its foundation the elements of human welfare, human dignity, and human justice. We are enjoined to:

If one examines patronage within the context of this framework, does it give support to the proposition that it is ethically wrong? Going back to the illustration of the New York City Parking Violations Bureau, I think clearly it does. Here, the use of patronage did harm — to the bureau, the city, and the public. It would be hard to argue that a greater good was served. It would be hard to argue that it was fair. Public jobs belong to the public, not the friends, relatives and supporters of a few. What happened with the Parking Violations Bureau was also an affront to the dignity and freedom of all of us, and diminished the image and luster of government.

On the other hand, how about the second case — the son/police officer? It seems to me that the elements of human freedom and rights, and of fairness and justice look quite different.

In deciding the ethical dimensions of patronage, and what, if any, regulation might be appropriate, it becomes a question of balancing the interests exposed in the three elements above, and each of us might balance differently. For me, the “greater good” is overriding, and is not served by the traditional practice of patronage. The practice of patronage is government teaching a bad lesson about public service.

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